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Abstract 
 
The minimum legal drinking age (MLDA) is widely believed to save lives by reducing traffic 
fatalities  among  underage  drivers.      Further,  the  Federal  Uniform  Drinking  Age  Act,  which 
pressured all states to adopt an MLDA of 21, is regarded as having contributed enormously to this 
life saving effect.   This paper challenges both claims.  State-level panel data for the past 30 years 
show that any nationwide impact of the MLDA is driven by states that increased their MLDA 
prior to any inducement from the federal government.  Even in early adopting states, the impact 
of the MLDA did not persist much past the year of adoption.  The MLDA appears to have only a 
minor impact on teen drinking.                                                                                                                                                                                2 
1. Introduction 
 
  The Federal Uniform Drinking Age Act (FUDAA), signed by President Ronald Reagan 
on July 17, 1984, threatened to withhold highway construction funds from states that failed to 
increase  their  minimum  legal  drinking  age  (MLDA)  to  21  by  October  1,  1986.  Some  states 
complied without protest, but many states balked and sued the federal government to prevent 
implementation of the Act.  In South Dakota v. Dole (1987), however, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled the Act constitutional. The Court decided that the “relatively small financial inducement 
offered by Congress” was not so coercive “as to pass the point at which pressure turns into 
compulsion.”   The Court argued, in particular, that reducing traffic fatalities among 18-20 year 
olds  was  sufficient  reason  for  the  federal  government  to  intervene  in  an  arena  traditionally 
reserved to states.
1   
  Research subsequent to the Court’s decision appears to confirm that raising the MLDA 
saves lives, and much of it points to the FUDAA in particular. Relying on this research, the 
National  Highway  Traffic  Safety  Administration  (NHTSA)  attributes  substantial  declines  in 
motor vehicle fatalities to federal and state traffic-safety policies, particularly the MLDA21.  For 
example, NHTSA estimates the cumulative number of lives saved by the MLDA21 at 21,887 
through 2002 (U.S. Department of Transportation, March 2005).  
  We challenge the view that MLDAs reduce traffic fatalities, based on three findings.  
First,  the  overall  impact  estimated  in  earlier  research  is  driven  by  states  that  increased  their 
MLDA prior to any inducement from the federal government. Second, even in early adopting 
                                                 
1 In her dissent, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor expressed skepticism that a uniform drinking age 
of 21 across the United States would have the “life-saving’ effects that might justify federal 
encroachment on rights afforded to states under the 10
th Amendment to the Constitution (South 
Dakota v. Dole, 1987).  The 10
th Amendment states, “The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.  At least one of the authors believes that, even if the MLDA saves 
lives, the FUDAA is not constitutional. 
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states, the impact of the MLDA did not persist much past the year of adoption. Third, the MLDA  
has at most a minor impact on teen drinking. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the history of the 
MLDA and reviews the pre-existing literature. Section 3 examines the aggregate trends in the key 
variables. Section 4 describes the state-level data set and presents panel estimates of the relation 
between the MLDA and traffic fatalities.  Section 5 investigates the effects of the MLDA on teen 
drinking. 
 
2. Historical Background and Prior Literature 
  When the United States repealed Alcohol Prohibition in 1933, the 21
st Amendment left 
states free to legalize, regulate, or prohibit alcohol as they saw fit.  Most legalized but also 
enacted substantial regulation.  This new regulation typically included an MLDA.   
  Table 1 gives the MLDA set by each state after Prohibition ended.
2  State reactions to 
federal repeal varied, from Alabama maintaining state-level prohibition to Colorado legalizing 
alcohol without a minimum drinking age. In general states set an MLDA between 18 and 21. In 
1933,  32  states  had  an  MLDA  of  21  and  16  had  an  MLDA  between  18  and  20.  With  few 
exceptions, these MLDAs persisted through the late 1960s.  
  Between 1970 and 1976 thirty states lowered their MLDA from 21 to 18. These policy 
changes coincided with national efforts toward greater enfranchisement of youth, exemplified by 
the 26
th Amendment giving 18-20 year olds the right to vote. The reasons for lowering the MLDA 
are not well understood and may have varied by state. Perhaps the changes reflected Vietnam-era 
logic that a person old enough to die for America is old enough to drink (Asch and Levy 1987, 
Mosher 1980).  Whatever the reasons, the lower MLDAs “enfranchised” over five million 18-20 
year olds to buy alcohol (Males 1986, p. 183). 
                                                 
2 This table indicates the MLDA for beer with greater than 3.2% alcohol content. The previous 
literature has generally ignored that different alcohol types have different MLDAs. We consider 
this issue below. 
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  Soon after the reductions in the MLDAs, empirical studies claimed that traffic collisions 
and fatalities were increasing in states that lowered their MLDA.  Most prominently featured in 
congressional discussion were two comprehensive, multi-state studies on the “life-saving” effects 
of raising the MLDA—the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) study and the National 
Transportation  Safety  Board  (NTSB)  study.  According  to  Males  (1986),  both  studies  were 
referred to more than 50 times in the House and Senate debates, “almost to the exclusion of other 
research on the question” (p. 182).
 3 These research findings played a key role in reversing the 
trend toward lower MLDAs. The justification for the FUDAA, espoused by organizations like the 
Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving, the American Medical Association, and the National 
Safety Council, was that higher MLDAs resulted in fewer traffic fatalities among 18-20 year olds 
(Males, 1986).  
  After passage of the FUDAA, all states adopted an MLDA21 by the end of 1988. Table 2 
gives the most recent date each state switched to an MLDA21. Several states were early adopters 
(Michigan, Illinois, Maryland, and New Jersey), increasing their MLDAs before passage of the 
FUDAA. Other states were less eager to change. Colorado, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, South 
Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia passed MLDA21 legislation, for example, but each provided 
for repeal if the FUDAA were held unconstitutional (DISCUS, 1996). Texas and Kansas enacted 
“sunset  provisions”  allowing  the  MLDA  to  drop  back  to  18  once  federal  sanctions  expired 
(DISCUS, 1996).  When the Supreme Court upheld the legality of the FUDAA, states faced a 
strong incentive to maintain an MLDA21. Nevertheless, the differences in how states responded 
suggests a policy endogeneity that needs to be addressed.  
  Several authors have recently summarized the MLDA literature, so we do not review 
specific  papers  in  detail  (see  Shults  et  al.  2001,  Wagenaar  and  Toomey  2002).  Overall  the 
existing research finds a negative relationship between the MLDA and traffic fatalities, but most 
                                                 
3 Males (1986) argues that the two studies suffered from methodological and data limitations and 
had undeserved influence over the federal decision to intervene in state drinking age laws.  
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studies omit key variables and mainly analyze either cross-sectional data from one year or time-
series data in one state (Ruhm 1996). 
  The most important exception to this summary is Dee (1999), who uses state-level panel 
data and controls for state fixed-effects, state trends, year dummies, and other variables.  Dee's 
estimates “suggest that the movement to [a] higher MLDA reduced … traffic fatalities by at least 
9%” (Dee, 1999, p. 314).  Dee’s analysis forms the starting point for the empirical work below. 
  In addition to considering the impact of the MLDA on traffic fatalities, earlier literature 
also considers how the MLDA affects teen drinking.
4  Kaestner (2000) explains that most studies 
use cross-sectional data and fail to control for unmeasured state characteristics affecting both 
alcohol consumption and minimum drinking ages.  Again, Dee (1999) is an exception.  Using the 
same  techniques  just  described,  Dee  concludes  that  moving  away  from  an  MLDA  of  18  is 
associated with a reduction in heavy teen drinking of 8.4%.  More recently, Carpenter et al. 
(2007) replicate Dee (1999) and extend his sample to include 11 more years of data.
5  They find 
that  “exposure  to  an  MLDA  of  18  was  associated  with  a  statistically  significant  increase  in 
drinking participation and heavy drinking of about 4 and 3 percentage points, respectively” (p. 
21).
6  T h e y  a c k n o w l e d g e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  a d o p t i o n  of  the  MLDA21  might  have  increased 
underreporting.  
 
3. An Overview of the Aggregate Data 
 
  Before  examining  state-level  regressions  that  relate  traffic  fatality  rates  (TFR)  to 
MLDAs, we examine aggregate plots of the key variables.  The reason is that state-level data on 
traffic fatalities are not available until the mid-1970s, but aggregate data on total and 15-24 year 
                                                 
4 These studies rely on self-report of alcohol consumption.  Outlawing a behavior, however, 
might reduce the degree of self-reporting.  
 
5 We are grateful to Kitt Carpenter for granting permission to cite his working paper. 
 
6 An MLDA of 18 is the most permissive MLDA in the sample. 
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old fatalities exist back to 1913.  The 18-20 year old population is most relevant for the issues in 
this paper, but data for this age range are not available until 1975. The 18-20 fatality rate and the 
15-24 fatality rate are highly correlated, however, as shown in Figure 1, so examination of the 15-
24 TFR is likely informative. 
  Figure 2 presents the TFR for the total population and for 15-24 year olds for the period 
1913-2004.    These  two  series  follow  similar  patterns  over  the  past  ninety  years.  Both  TFRs 
increased from 1913 to 1969 and then decreased thereafter.   This similarity fails to suggest a 
major impact of the MLDA, which should have affected the 15-24 TFR more than the total TFR.  
The marked decline in the TFR during this period also contravenes claims of a rapid increase in 
traffic fatalities after several states decreased their MLDAs between 1970 and 1973. The declines 
in the total and 15-24 TFR that began around 1969 long precede the adoptions of an MLDA of 21 
in the mid-1980s. 
  The data in Figure 2 do not control for the vehicle miles traveled (VMT) each year, 
which have increased enormously over the past century (National Safety Council, 2004).  Figure 
3  shows  that  fatalities  per  VMT  exhibit  a  persistent  downward  trend  over  the  entire  sample 
period.    The  15-24  TFR  does  seem  to  increase  slightly  beginning  in  the  1960s,  even  when 
controlling for VMT, but the decline returns around 1969, prior to passage of the FUDAA.  
  Figure 4 plots the average MLDA for all 50 states against the (VMT-based) TFR for the 
15-24 year old age cohort.
7 While the average MLDA remained at approximately 20 between 
1944 and 1970, traffic fatalities continued to decrease for years and then increased. Then in the 
early 1970s, several states lowered their MLDAs, reducing the average to below 19.  Yet the brief 
increase  in  traffic  fatality  rates  that  occurred  in  the  latter  half  of  the  1970s  looks  modest  in 
comparison to the larger, downward trend that preceded these changes to the MLDA. Previous 
studies that focused on the late 1970s and the early 1980s were unlikely to see this longstanding 
                                                 
7 We obtain similar results with a population-weighted, average MLDA. 
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trend. Overall, the TFR has been decreasing steadily since 1969, but most of the variation in the 
MLDA occurred in the 1980s.  The one major increase in traffic fatalities, from 1961-1967, 
occurred while the average MLDA remained constant.   
  The  key  fact  about  TFRs,  therefore,  is  that  they  have  been  trending  downward  for 
decades and have been poorly correlated with the MLDAs.  Moreover, several others factors 
likely played a role in this downward movement.  These factors include advances in medical 
technology,  advances  in  car  design  (air-bags,  anti-lock  brakes,  seat  belts,  safety  glass),  and 
improved  education  about  driving  strategies  and  the  risks  associated  with  motor  vehicles 
(Houston et al., 1995).
8   
  The aggregate data thus provide little confirmation that MLDAs reduce traffic fatalities.  
These data also suggest the importance of controlling for pre-existing trends.  We address this 
concern in the analysis that follows.  
 
4.  Data and Results 
  We next examine the relation between MLDAs and traffic fatalities using state-level 
panel data.  This approach is better targeted than the aggregate approach considered above, since 
it allows us to compare fatalities within each state to changes in the MLDA in that state. 
  We  measure  traffic  fatalities  using  the  Fatality  Analysis  Reporting  System  (FARS). 
FARS contains the characteristics of vehicles, drivers, occupants, and non-occupants involved in 
all recorded fatal motor vehicle accidents in the United States. Dee (1999) uses the FARS to 
construct  a  panel  data  set  for  the  48  contiguous  states  over  the  period  1977-1992.
  9    W e  
reconstruct Dee’s (1999) data set and extend it to include Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington DC 
                                                 
8 Harris et al. (2002) find that “the downward trend in lethality [of criminal assault] involves 
parallel developments in medical technology and related medical support services.”  These appear 
to have brought down the homicide rate even as aggravated assault rates remained constant. 
 
9 We thank Thomas Dee for generously providing us with some of the data used to replicate his 
1999 paper.                                                                                                                                                                                8 
and the years 1976 and 1993-2005. We focus on 18-20 year–old fatalities because this group is 
most directly affected by changes in MLDA laws.   Robustness checks reported later examine 
younger and older age groups. 
  We  merge  the  FARS  data  with  population  information  from  the  Census  Bureau  to 
construct age-specific vehicular fatality rates.  We also include the unemployment rate, real per 
capita personal income, a binary indicator for whether a state has a mandatory seat belt law, the 
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit for legal driving, beer taxes, and total vehicle miles 
traveled. The last variable is a proxy for the vehicle miles traveled by 18-20 year olds, as mileage 
data are not age-specific.  Table 3 presents summary statistics.  
  We omit several potentially relevant policies, in part to conform with Dee (1999), in part 
because of data availability, and in part because previous studies have found limited evidence of 
any impact on traffic fatality rates. These variables include dram shop liability laws, mandatory 
sentences  for  driving  under  the  influence  (DUI),  sobriety  check  points,  anti-plea  bargaining 
statutes, changes in tort liability laws that place greater responsibility with intoxicated drivers, 
happy-hour regulations, and alcohol education programs.    
  Using this data set, we estimate 
  ln(TFRst/(1-TFRst)) = β1MLDAst + β2Controlsst + β3 (state trend) + us + vt + est          (1) 
 
where β1 is the point estimate of how MLDA laws influence traffic fatalities, β2 is a vector of  
determinants of traffic fatalities, β3  is the linear trend for each state, us is a state fixed-effect, vt is 
a  year-effect,  and  est i s  a  m e a n -zero  random  error.    We  choose  this  form  for  the  dependent 
variable to follow Dee (1999).  We estimate this specification using weighted least squares. If 
TFRst is the traffic fatality rate, and the regressand is ln(TFRst /(1- TFRst)), then the error term is 
heteroscedastic, with variance (TFRst (l - TFRst)nst)
-1,  where nst is the age-specific population for 
the fatality rate (Ruhm 1996).  In contrast to Dee, we cluster standard errors by state, although                                                                                                                                                                                9 
this makes little difference to the results.  As in Dee, we initially model the MLDA using separate 
variables for an MLDA of 19, 20, or 21 (all other states have 18). 
  Table 4 reports estimates of Equation (1).
10  Model (1) uses Dee’s sample and replicates 
his results closely.  In this specification an MLDA21 reduces traffic fatalities by 11.7%.
11  The 
insignificant coefficients on an MLDA19 and an MLDA20 are in accordance with Dee’s findings. 
Model (2) extends the sample to include Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia, as well as 
the years 1976 and 1993-2005.  This confirms Dee’s findings that an MLDA21 reduces total 
traffic fatalities among 18-20 year olds by about 11%. Model (3) adds VMT, one variable that is 
available by state but that Dee did not include, and a dummy for whether the state has a BAC .08 
per se law.  This reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on MLDA21 to roughly 8%, but the 
significance  remains.  Models  (2)  and  (3)  report  standard  errors  clustered  by  state.  The 
significance of MLDA21 persists, though neither MLDA19 nor MLDA20 is significant. 
  The  small  and  insignificant  coefficients  on  MLDA19  and  MLDA20  present  a  mild 
challenge to the claim that the MLDA reduces traffic fatalities. If restricting access to alcohol 
works  as  typically  assumed,  then  though  the  MLDA21  should  have  the  largest  impact,  the 
MLDA19  and  MLDA20  should  also  reduce  fatalities  if  restricting  access  works  as  typically 
assumed. This anomaly is not decisive because few states utilized an MLDA of 19 or 20, so the 
weak results might just reflect noise. Nevertheless, the coefficients are not always negative and 
never significant. 
  The results so far support two claims. Panel-data estimates suggest a substantial and 
statistically significant impact of the MLDA21.  Aggregate data, however, make at most a weak 
                                                 
10 The panel data set begins in 1976 because state unemployment rates are not available prior to 
that year. 
 
11 The slight difference between our findings and Dee’s likely results from revised Census Bureau 
population data.  
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case, so the overall conclusion is not clear.  To reconcile these different estimates, we conduct a 
state-by-state analysis of how the MLDA affects traffic fatalities. 
  Figure 5 graphs TFR18-20 in several states, along with an indicator for whether the state 
adopted an MLDA21.  In South Carolina, TFR18-20 was increasing rapidly prior to adoption and 
then began a marked decline, consistent with an effect of the MLDA21 in reducing 18-20 year 
old  fatalities.  In  California,  however,  TFR18-20  also  declined  dramatically  even  though  the 
MLDA was 21 throughout.   In South Dakota and Louisiana, TFR18-20 declined prior to the 
increase in the MLDA and seems to have decreased at a slower rate after MLDA21 adoption.
12  
These four graphs, therefore, show a wide range of “impacts” of the MLDA.  Plots for all 50 
states confirm substantial heterogeneity in MLDA21’s effect. 
  To examine this in more detail, Table 5 presents state-by-state estimates of the effects of  
the MLDA. Of the 38 states that increased their MLDA over the post 1975 time period, the 
MLDA21 reduced fatalities in six at the 5% level and in nine at the 10% level. At the same time, 
however, the MLDA21 increased fatalities in four states at the 5% level and in five at the 10% 
level.   In eleven states the coefficient on MLDA is positive but insignificant while in thirteen it is 
negative but insignificant.  
  This heterogeneity suggests Dee’s results are driven by a few states in which the impact 
is sufficiently negative to outweigh the positive or small impact in most states.  The question is 
whether this heterogeneity is just sampling variation or something more systematic.  We show 
below  that  the  overall  negative  impact  results  from  states  that  adopted  the  MLDA21  before 
1984—that is, before the FUDAA.  
  Table 6 presents evidence for this claim. Model (1) repeats Model (1) from Table 4 for 
ease of comparison.  Model (2) restricts the sample to those states that adopted the MLDA21 after 
1979; this eliminates all states that had an MLDA21 prior to when FARS began collecting data. 
                                                 
12 South Dakota and Louisiana were two states that challenged the constitutionality of the Federal 
Uniform Drinking Age Act. 
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The results are robust across this change in specification. Model (3) restricts the sample to those 
states that changed to an MLDA21 during or after 1983.
13 Again the MLDA 21 is significant, 
with a point estimate of -.07.  
  Model (4), however, which restricts the sample to states that changed their MLDA to 21 
during or after 1984, results in a lower point estimate (-.058) that is not significant at even the 
10% level. Model (5), which restricts the sample to those states that changed the MLDA after 
1984, produces a coefficient on MLDA21 near zero with a t-statistic of -.21.
14 Model (6) excludes 
Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, and New Jersey, the four earliest states to change their MLDA back 
to 21, each doing so on or before January 1983. When the sample excludes these states, the 
significance of MLDA21 disappears and its magnitude drops to -0.035.
15  
  The year 1984 is when the federal government became directly involved in state-level 
MLDA legislation. The federal government’s threat to withhold highway funding from states is 
arguably an exogenous shock to state-level MLDA policy.   Thus if causality is to be attributed to 
the MLDA, inference should focus especially on states that increased their MLDAs in response to 
this (arguably) exogenous pressure.  Yet the results for these states show virtually no effect of the 
MLDA21.  Those states driving the relation between MLDA21 and TFR18-20 are the ones that 
proactively changed their MLDA legislation prior to federal involvement.  
  These  results  suggest  that,  at  most,  the  MLDA21  reduced  TFR18-20  in  states  that 
adopted on their own.  This raises the question of endogeneity.  The MLDA21 in these states may 
have  been  enacted  in  response  to  grassroots  concern  against  drunk  driving  or  implemented 
                                                 
13 No states changed their MLDA to 21 in 1981 or 1982.  
 
14 The MLDA laws were coded such that a year cell has an MLDA21 indicator of 1 if the MLDA 
of 21 was in effect for at least half that year. As the FUDAA was passed in July, Model (4)  
includes states that adopted an MLDA21 before its passage. Model (5) differs in including states 
that adopted an MLDA21 after 1984. 
 
15 These results are robust across specifications that allow for quadratic state trends.                                                                                                                                                                                 12 
alongside other efforts to reduce traffic fatalities.  Relatedly, states that adopted on their own may 
have been states that devoted significant resources to enforcement. 
  To address the possible endogeneity of MLDA legislation, we modify the specification of 
the MLDA variable.  Instead of a dummy for years in which it is in effect, we include several 
binary  variables  representing  an  interval  of  time  in  relation  to  the  date  a  state  enacted  an 
MLDA21. For example, the binary variable “5-6 Before” is equal to 1 for every state-year that is 
5-6 years before a state adopted an MLDA of 21. The other intervals included in the regressions 
are “3-4 Before,” “1-2 Before,” “Year of Enactment,” “1-2 After,” “3-4 After,” “5-6 After,” “7-8 
After,” and “9-10 After.”  This empirical strategy improves on the approach in Section 4 because 
the  time  pattern  of  policy  effects  informs  both  the  extent  of  policy  endogeneity  and  the 
persistence of the policy’s effect.    
  Table 7 gives estimates of this alternative specification; figures 6-9 plot the coefficients 
and  standard  error  bands  on  the  MLDA21  variables.    Model  (1)  supports  the  claim  that  the 
MLDA  legislation  was  not  a  significant  determinant  of  traffic  fatality  rates,  as  none  of  the 
coefficients is significant at even the 10% level.  The pattern of coefficients mildly suggests that 
the  MLDA  reduces  TFR18-20,  but  the  pre-adoption  coefficients  are  positive,  and  the  effect 
approaches zero in the years following enactment.   
  In Model (2), which includes only the states that adopted their MLDA21 during or prior 
to 1983, there does seem to be a significant and large drop in fatalities during the year of MLDA 
increase.  Though  not  significant,  this  decrease  predates  the  adoption  of  the  MLDA21  across 
states, as illustrated by the negative coefficients on the binary indicators dating back six years 
before policy enactment. In the year of adoption, fatalities declined 16.7% at the 5% significance 
level. Yet as early as 1-2 years after enactment, the MLDA is no longer significant and the point 
estimate increases from -16.7% to -5.4%. More interestingly, the MLDA21 seems to increase 
fatalities  from  three  to  six  years  after  enactment,  although  the  result  is  not  significant.  This 
suggests the fatality-reductions due to MLDA21 policies were transient or even perverse.                                                                                                                                                                                13 
  Model (3) restricts the sample to those states that enacted an MLDA21 during or after 
1984. Those states experienced increases in 18-20 year old fatalities leading up to enactment of 
an MLDA21; upon the adoption, there was no significant decrease in fatalities, and as soon as 1-2 
years after adoption the increase in traffic fatalities became significant at the 10% level. As with 
the early adopters, the coefficient on MLDA21 approaches zero five years beyond adoption.  
  Model  (4)  restricts  the  sample  to  states  that  adopted  the  MLDA21  after  1984.  The 
estimates suggest that 1 to 2 years after adoption, states experienced a 10% increase in 18-20 
traffic fatalities, significant at the 1% level. The effect persists at the 10% significance level 3-4 
years after the adoption. In these states the traffic fatality rate of 18-20 year olds seems to have 
been increasing prior to the adoption of the MLDA 21. In states that were pressured to change 
their MLDAs, the changes were likely inconsequential or even counterproductive.
16    
  Several additional findings are also inconsistent with the claim that the minimum legal 
drinking age reduces traffic fatalities. Table 8 presents regressions analogous to those in Table 6, 
but  using  the  17  year  old  driver  fatalities  as  the  dependent  variable,  find  that  MLDA19, 
MLDA20, and MLDA21 all increase traffic fatalities at the 5% level of significance.   One 
explanation is that when the MLDA is 18, more high school students have access to alcohol 
through peer networks, including 18 year olds. When the MLDA is higher, these peer networks 
are  less  effective  at  obtaining  alcohol,  so  individuals  younger  than  18  feel  pressure  to  drink 
intensely  at  each  drinking  occasion.  Alternatively,  when  the  MLDA  is  18,  law  enforcement 
monitors the drinking behavior of individuals aged 17 and younger. When the MLDA is 21, this 
monitoring is spread more thinly, resulting in more drinking among 17 year olds. 
  A final result concerns construction of the MLDA variable. Many states employ different 
MLDAs for different categories of alcoholic beverages. For example, as of October 1983, North 
Carolina had an MLDA of 19 for beer and table wine but an MLDA of 21 for fortified wine and 
distilled spirits. Historically, states have been most willing to lower their MLDAs for beer. When 
                                                 
16 These results are robust across specifications that allow for quadratic state trends.                                                                                                                                                                                 14 
it happens that only one alcohol category has an MLDA below 21, the MLDA variable used in 
earlier literature and our regressions has been set to that value. This might provide a misleading 
picture of the MLDA’s impact. 
  To address this we estimate models that include an MLDA variable for strong beer, weak 
beer, fortified wine, table wine, and spirits.  Table 9 presents results.  In this specification none of 
the coefficients on an MLDA variable is significant, and no single coefficient has an absolute 
value greater than .03. The coefficients on the MLDA for strong beer and fortified wine are 
positive, while the coefficients on the MLDA for weak beer, table wine, and spirits are negative. 
This  lack  of  consistency  reaffirms  the  tenuous  relationship  between  the  MLDA  and  traffic 
fatalities. 
 
5. The MLDA and Teen Alcohol Consumption 
  The final question we address is why the MLDA does not appear to have had much effect 
on traffic fatalities.  One possibility is that although the MLDA reduces 18-20 year old drinking, 
it does so mainly for those who drink responsibly.  Another possibility is that the MLDA does not 
reduce drinking to a substantial degree.  The previous literature has suggested that the MLDA 
does reduce teen drinking.  We revisit that question here. 
  We utilize data from Monitoring the Future, an annual survey of high school seniors that 
contains measures of drinking habits.  We employ the two specific measures common in the 
literature, “drinker” (having any drink of alcohol in the last month), and “heavy episodic drinker” 
(having five or more drinks in a row at some point in the last two weeks).  We also examine the 
number of motor vehicle accidents that respondents report as occurring after consuming alcohol.   
We estimate regressions similar to those considered above but with these dependent variables.   
The measure of the MLDA is identical to that used in previous literature, a dummy for having a 
drinking age of 18.                                                                                                                                                                                15 
  Tables  10  and  Table  11  give  results.    Though  we  use  slightly  different  data  than 
Carpenter et al. (2007), we approximate their findings.  Models (1) and (2) in Tables 10 and 11 
show an MLDA18 is associated with an almost 4% increase in drinking participation rates, and 
approximately a 3% increase in heavy episodic drinking rates, both significant at the 1% level.  
  Model (3) and (4), however, suggest that these reductions derive mainly from states that 
adopted the MLDA21 before enactment of the FUDAA.
17  Model (3) shows that in the early-
adopting states, the MLDA 18 is associated with a 5% increase in drinking participation and a 
3.7%  increase  in  heavy  drinking,  both  significant  at  the  1%  level.    In  later-adopting  states, 
exposure to an MLDA of 18 has a weaker and insignificant effect on alcohol consumption. 
  Two interpretations of these results are possible. The absence of any effect of MLDA18 
in  reducing  drinking  in  the  coerced  adopters  is  consistent  with  the  absence  of  any  effect  of 
MLDA21 on traffic fatalities.  The negative effects found for early adopters might reflect a true 
reduction in alcohol consumption and also explain a reduction in fatalities in these states.   Yet 
these negative effects might also reflect an increase in underreporting in the MTF data due to 
enactment of MLDA21. 
  One mechanism for resolving this is to examine the number of alcohol-related traffic 
accidents reported by MTF respondents. If the MLDA works as predicted and underage persons 
are deterred from drinking, the number of accidents post-alcohol consumption should decline 
when a state adopts an MLDA21. The results in Table 12 are telling. The panel estimates reveal 
that movement away from an MLDA of 18 is associated with a statistically insignificant  
-.0007 change in reporting of alcohol-related traffic accidents. Given these findings, it is not 
surprising that Higson et al. found that “although the modes of procuring alcohol changed, no 
significant changes were observed in Massachusetts relative to New York in the proportion of 
surveyed teenagers who reported that they drank or in the volume of their consumption” (p. 163).  
                                                 
17 The relevance of the MLDA of 21 to consumption patterns among high school seniors is that in 
a large number of states, movement away from a drinking age of 18 was brought about by the 
adoption of an MLDA of 21.                                                                                                                                                                                 16 
6. Conclusion 
  The  MLDA21  is  predicated  on  the  belief  that  it  reduces  alcohol-related  teen  traffic-
fatalities. We challenge that claim, showing that the MLDA fails to have the fatality-reducing 
effects that previous papers have reported.  
  If not the MLDA, then what might explain the drastic reductions in traffic fatalities over 
the past half century? Figure 2 suggests that the decline began in the year 1969, the year in which 
several  landmark  improvements  were  made  in  the  accident  avoidance  and  crash  protection 
features of passenger cars. Table 13, taken from Crandall et al. (1986) shows just how many 
federal safety standards were introduced in the 1968 model year. They explain that “most of these 
standards for new automobiles were in place by 1970,” which allowed for improvements in over 
three dozen safety measures not previously found in automobiles (Crandall et all, 1986, p. 47). 
Further research might operationalize these advancements in vehicle safety as they are likely to 
be major determinants of the declining traffic fatality trends. 
  The  same  effort  should  be  made  to  measure  and  control  for  advances  in  medical 
technology. In this way, researchers can ascertain whether traffic fatalities are declining because 
traffic crashes are becoming less frequent or becoming less lethal. Future studies estimating the 
relationship  between  the  MLDA  and  traffic  fatality  rates  might  use  as  control  variables  the 
number of blood banks, the number of hospital admissions, the number of hospitals that provide 
open-heart surgery, the number of hospital affiliated physicians, or the number of hospital beds in 
the state (Harris et al., 2002).  
  In arguing against an MLDA of 21, this paper also challenges the desirability of coercive 
federalism.  The case of the drinking age informs several other public policy debates, including 
the  appropriateness  of  the  No  Child  Left  Behind  Act  (NCLB).  When  the  governor  of  Utah 
attempted to ignore NCLB’s provisions that conflicted with Utah’s own education policy, the 
Department  of  Education  threatened  to  withhold  federal  education  funding  (Fusarelli,  2005). 
Fusarelli (2005) argues that such actions demonstrate that in just “a few short years, federal                                                                                                                                                                                17 
education  policy  had  shifted  from  minimal  federal  involvement  (President  Reagan  wanted  to 
abolish the U.S. Department of Education) to the development of voluntary national standards 
(under President Clinton) to the new law mandating testing of all students in Grades 3–8” (p. 
121). Whether Congress has violated the 10
th amendment with NCLB is a question left for the 
Supreme  Court.  Nevertheless,  the  empirical  strategy  employed  in  this  paper  might  tease  out 
whether  the  successes  attributed  to  the  NCLB  are  similarly  driven  by  states  that  proactively 
adopted its standards of education reform prior to the federal mandate. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  18 
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APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES 
 
The sources of all the variables used in the reported regressions are listed below. 
    
Fatalities 
Data obtained from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS). 
 
Consumption 
  Data  obtained  from  private-use  extract  from  the  Monitoring  the  Future  Surveys, 
  contractually  granted  by  the  Institute  for  Social  Research  at  the  University  of 
  Michigan 
 
Population  
  Data obtained from the United States Census Bureau. 
 
Fatality Rates 1913-2005 
  Data obtained from the National Safety Council, 2005 Publication of Injury Facts. 
 
Vehicles Miles Traveled 
  Data  obtained  from  thirty  issues  of  the  Federal  Highway  Administration’s  annual 
  publication, Highway Statistics. 
 
Per Capita Personal Income Rates 
  Data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
 
Beer Tax 
  Data  obtained  from  the  United  States  Brewers’  Association,  Brewers  Almanac, 
  published annually, 1941-present. 
 
Unemployment Rates 
  Data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
 
BAC .08 Laws 
  Data obtained from several issues of The Insurance Fact Book, published annually by 
  the Insurance Information Institute. 
 
MLDA Laws 
  Data obtained from Distilled Spirits Council of United States. 
 
Mandatory Seat Belt Laws 
  Data obtained from several issues of The Insurance Fact Book, published annually by 
  the Insurance Information Institute. 
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          TABLES 
 
 
 
Table 1: Minimum Legal Drinking Age Levels in States After Repeal of Prohibition, 
1933 
 
AL 
Alcohol 
Prohibited 
 
KY 
 
21 
 
ND 
 
21 
AK  18  LA  21  OH  16 
AZ  21  ME  18  OK  21 
AR  21  MD  21  OR  21 
CA  21  MA  21  PA  21 
CO  None  MI  18  RI  21 
CT  21  MN  21  SC  18 
DE  21  MS  18  SD  18 
DC  18  MO  21  TN  21 
FL  21  MT  21  TX  21 
GA  21  NE  20  UT  21 
HI  20  NV  21  VT  18 
ID  20  NH  21  VA  18 
IL  21  NJ  21  WA  21 
IN  21  NM  21  WV  18 
IA  21  NY  21  WI  18 
KS  18  NC  18  WY  21 
Table 2: States’ Most Recent Date of Adopting an MLDA of 21 
AL  10/85  KY  05/38  ND  12/36 
AK  10/83  LA  03/87  OH  08/87 
AZ  01/85  ME  07/85  OK  09/83 
AR  03/35  MD  07/82  OR  12/33 
CA  12/33  MA  06/85  PA  07/35 
CO  07/87  MI  12/78  RI  07/84 
CT  09/85  MN  09/86  SC  09/86 
DE  01/84  MS  10/86  SD  04/88 
DC  10/86  MO  05/45  TN  08/84 
FL  07/85  MT  05/87  TX  09/86 
GA  09/86  NE  01/85  UT  03/35 
HI  10/86  NV  12/33  VT  07/86 
ID  04/87  NH  06/85  VA  07/85 
IL  01/80  NJ  01/83  WA  01/34 
IN  01/34  NM  12/34  WV  07/86 
IA  07/86  NY  12/85  WI  09/86 
KS  07/85  NC  09/86  WY  07/88                                                                                                                                                                                22 
     
Table  3:  Summary  Statistics  for  Variables  Used  in  the  Construction  of  the  Dependent 
Variables and Endogenous Regressors, 1976-2005.  
 
Variable 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
MLDA  1530  20.39  1.11  18  21 
Total fatality rate  1530  19.39  7.12  5.52  59.51 
18-20 fatality rate  1530  43.36  18.53  0  168.41 
17 & under fatality rate  1530  9.87  3.98  .79  31.28 
21-23 fatality rate  1530  38.55  15.92  0  161.72 
25-29 fatality rate  1530  26.83  11.41  1.50  95.28 
Per capita personal income  1530  19165.38  8603.89  4744  54985 
State unemployment rate  1530  5.96  2.00  2.30  17.4 
Total vehicle miles traveled  1530  42410.23  46065.99  2527  329267 
BAC08  Limit?  1530  .20  .40  0  1 
Seat Belt Law?  1530  .57  .49  0  1 
Beer Tax  1520  .52  .18  .24  1.86 
Fatality rates are per hundred thousand members of the age-specific state population. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
WLS Estimates of Teen Traffic Fatality Equation,  18-20 Year Olds 
Specification    Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
  Dee  (1999) 
published 
results 
Replication  
of Dee (1999) 
Dee  (1999) 
extended 
13  years,  plus 
HI, AK, & D.C. 
Model  (2) 
controlling  for 
VMT  and  BAC 
.08 
         
MLDA 19  -0.022  -0.028  -0.021  -0.014 
  (1.06)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.021) 
MLDA 20  -0.009  0.007  -0.012  -0.004 
  (.22)  (0.053)  (0.036)  (.034) 
MLDA 21  -0.110  -0.117  -0.110  -0.08 
  (3.98)***  (0.031)***  (0.032)***  (0.032)**                                                                                                                                                                                23 
 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of TFRst /(1-TFRst ) where TFRst is the 18-20 year 
old total fatality rate for state s at time t. The estimations are weighted by n(TFRst )(1-TFRst ) 
where n is 18-20 year old population in state s at time t. Dee’s results, as well as Models (1) and 
(2)  include  variables  controlling  for  the  state  unemployment  rate,  state  average  per  capita 
personal income, the beer tax rate in the state, and a binary indicator for any mandatory seat belt 
law. Additionally, Model (3) controls for whether the state has a BAC .08 law and vehicle miles 
traveled within the state. Robust standard errors are reported below point estimates for Models (1) 
– (3). Standard errors clustered by state are reported for Model (2) and Model (3). Dee’s original 
results were reported with t-statistics instead of standard errors, and are reproduced as such.  
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
State by State OLS Estimates with Newey-West HAC Standard Errors of 
MLDA Regressed on Total Traffic Fatalities among 18-20 Year Olds  
1976-2005 
State  MLDA  SE  State  MLDA  SE 
AL  0.065  (0.054)  MT  0.168  (0.054)*** 
AK  -0.406  (0.206)*  NE  -0.034  (0.127) 
AZ  -0.065  (0.054)  NV     
AR      NH  -0.153  (0.146) 
CA      NJ  -0.176  (0.032)*** 
CO  0.063  (0.031)*  NM     
CT  -0.244  (0.071)***  NY  0.007  (0.053) 
DE  0.092  (0.158)  NC  -0.124  (0.024)*** 
FL  0.076  (0.07)  ND     
GA  -0.018  (0.028)  OH  -0.012  (0.028) 
HI  0.356  (0.144)**  OK  -0.055  (0.024)** 
ID  -0.023  (0.093)  OR     
IL  -0.066  (0.059)  PA     
IN      RI  -0.31  (0.123)** 
IA  -0.102  (0.068)  SC  0.166  (0.052)*** 
KS  0.102  (0.034)***  SD  0.092  (0.11) 
KY      TN  0.015  (0.086) 
LA  -0.05  (0.029)*  TX  -0.056  (0.035) 
ME  0.078  (0.091)  UT     
MD  -0.104  (0.025)***  VT  0.038  (0.031) 
MA  0.04  (0.129)  VA  0.097  (0.075)                                                                                                                                                                                24 
MI  -0.1  (0.053)*  WA     
MN  -0.116  (0.128)  WV  -0.176  (0.126) 
MS  0.013  (0.033)  WI  -0.055  (0.034) 
MO      WY  -0.142  (0.089) 
 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of TFRt /(1-TFRt ) where TFRt is the 18-
20 year old total fatality rate at time t. States with black cells are ones that had already 
had in place an MLDA of 21 before 1976, and thus had no variation in MLDA over 
the last 30 years. Red indicates a coefficient is negative and significant at least at the 
10% level. Blue indicates a coefficient is positive and significant at least at the 10% 
level. The regressions include controls for the state unemployment rate, state average per 
capita personal income, the beer tax rate in the state, total vehicle miles traveled in the 
state, the BAC limit for driving in a state, and a binary indicator for any mandatory seat 
belt law. Newey-West HAC standard errors are reported.  
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of TFRst /(1-TFRst ) where TFRst is the 18-20 
year old total fatality rate for state s at time t. The estimations are weighted by n(TFRst )(1-
Table 6 
WLS Estimates of Total Traffic Fatality Equation 18-20 Year Olds, 1976-2005 
Samples Restricted by Year States Adopted an MLDA of 21 
Specification  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
  Not 
Restricted 
States that 
changed 
MLDA to 
21 before 
1980 
States that 
changed 
MLDA to 
21 before 
1983 
States that 
changed 
MLDA to 
21 
between 
1984-2005 
States that 
changed 
MLDA to 
21 
between 
1985-2005 
All states 
1975-
2005, w/o 
IL, MI, 
MD, NJ 
MLDA 19  -0.014  -0.01  -0.011  -0.01  -0.008  -0.013 
  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
MLDA 20  -0.004  0.001  0.003  0.004  0.014  0.004 
  (.034)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.039)  (0.035) 
MLDA 21  -0.08  -0.087  -0.069  -0.058  -0.008  -0.035 
  (0.032)**  (0.030)***  (0.034)**  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037) 
Constant  75.177  67.985  71.45  74.904  73.781  79.8 
  (19.260)***  (24.944)***  (25.074)***  (25.271)***  (28.895)**  (20.110)*** 
State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustered SE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1519  1129  1099  1069  949  1399 
R-squared  0.87  0.87  0.86  0.86  0.86  0.86                                                                                                                                                                                25 
TFRst ) where n is 18-20 year old population in state s at time t. All models include variables 
controlling for the state unemployment rate, state average per capita personal income, the 
beer tax rate in the state, vehicle miles traveled within state, the BAC limit for driving in a 
state, and a binary indicator for any mandatory seat belt law. They also allow for linear state 
trends. Robust standard errors are reported below point estimates.  
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
WLS Estimates of Total Traffic Fatality Rate 18-20 Year Olds, 1976-2005 
Samples Restricted by Year States Adopted an MLDA of 21 
 
Specification  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
  Not restricted  States that 
changed MLDA 
to 21 before 
1983 
States that 
changed MLDA 
to 21 between 
1984-2005 
States that 
changed MLDA 
to 21 between 
1985-2005 
5-6 Years Before  0.022  -0.061  0.023  0.023 
  (0.026)  (0.059)  (0.034)  (0.044) 
3-4 Years Before  0.014  -0.019  0.039  0.004 
  (0.02)  (0.059)  (0.046)  (0.054) 
1-2 Years Before  0.022  -0.014  0.073  0.029 
  (0.023)  (0.059)  (0.041)*  (0.045) 
Year of Enactment  -0.042  -0.167  0.055  0.045 
  (0.033)  (0.054)***  (0.044)  (0.051) 
1-2 Years After  -0.016  -0.054  0.08  0.102 
  (0.024)  (0.038)  (0.041)*  (0.036)*** 
3-4 Years After  -0.012  0.017  0.061  0.094 
  (0.026)  (0.053)  (0.059)  (0.049)* 
5-6 Years After  -0.006  0.025  0.016  0.038 
  (0.026)  (0.041)  (0.046)  (0.042) 
7-8 Years After  -0.027  0.06  -0.04  -0.043 
  (0.032)  (0.031)*  (0.042)  (0.052) 
9-10 Years After  0.002  0.042  0.006  0.005 
  (0.022)  (0.037)  (0.027)  (0.036) 
Constant  81.07  77.964  87.804  74.012 
  (19.929)***  (38.567)*  (27.225)***  (28.653)** 
State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustered SE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1519  450  1069  949 
R-squared  0.87  0.89  0.86  0.86                                                                                                                                                                                26 
 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of TFRst /(1-TFRst ) where TFRst is the 18-20 
year old total fatality rate for state s at time t. The estimations are weighted by n(TFRst )(1-
TFRst ) where n is 18-20 year old population in state s at time t. All models include variables 
controlling for the state unemployment rate, state average per capita personal income, the 
beer tax rate in the state, vehicle miles traveled within state, the BAC limit for driving in a 
state, and a binary indicator for any mandatory seat belt law. They also allow for linear state 
trends. Robust standard errors are reported below point estimates.  
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of TFRst /(1-TFRst ) where TFRst is the age-
specific fatality rate for drivers in state s at time t. The estimations are weighted by n(TFRst 
)(1-TFRst ) where n is age-specific population in state s at time t. All models include variables 
controlling for the state unemployment rate, state average per capita personal income, the 
beer tax rate in the state, vehicle miles traveled within state, the BAC limit for driving in a 
state, and a binary indicator for any mandatory seat belt law. They also allow for linear state 
trends. Robust standard errors are reported below point estimates.  
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 8 
WLS Estimates of Total Driver Fatality Rate, Selected Age Groups 
1976-2005 
Specification  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
Dependent Variable:  Driver Fatality Rate, 
persons aged 17 and 
under 
Driver Fatality Rate, 
persons aged 18 to 20 
years old 
Driver Fatality Rate, 
persons aged 21 to 23 
years old 
MLDA 19  0.073  -0.007  0.015 
  (0.032)**  (0.023)  (0.027) 
MLDA 20  0.102  0.007  0.026 
  (0.036)***  (0.04)  (0.052) 
MLDA 21  0.092  -0.08  -0.029 
  (0.035)**  (0.034)**  (0.031) 
Constant  71.496  72.571  83.494 
  (35.141)**  (25.698)***  (21.259)*** 
State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustered SE    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1501  1516  1517 
R-squared  0.85  0.85  0.82                                                                                                                                                                                27 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of TFRst /(1-TFRst ) where TFRst is the 18-20 
year old total fatality rate for state s at time t. The estimations are weighted by n(TFRst )(1-
TFRst ) where n is 18-20 year old population in state s at time t. All models include variables 
controlling for the state unemployment rate, state average per capita personal income, the 
beer tax rate in the state, vehicle miles traveled within state, the BAC limit for driving in a 
state, and a binary indicator for any mandatory seat belt law. They also allow for linear state 
trends. Robust standard errors are reported below point estimates.  
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
WLS Estimates of Fatality Rates of 18-20 Year Olds by Various MLDA Laws, 
1977-2005 
Dependent Variable:  Total Traffic Fatality rate 18-20 year olds 
MLDA Near Beer  -0.017 
  (0.02) 
MLDA Strong Beer  0.028 
  (0.019) 
MLDA Table Wine  -0.031 
  (0.018) 
MLDA Fortified Wine  0.009 
  (0.047) 
MLDA Spirits  -0.028 
  (0.046) 
Constant  71.503 
  (17.921)*** 
State Fixed Effects  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes 
State Trends  Yes 
Controls  Yes 
Clustered SE  Yes 
Observations  1519 
R-squared  0.87                                                                                                                                                                                28 
 
Table 10 
WLS Estimates of MLDA 18 Effects on Drinking Participation Rates 
in High School Seniors, 1976-2004 MTF 
    Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
  Carpenter 
et al. 
(2007) 
estimates: 
1976-2003 
Replicating 
Carpenter et 
al. (2007) 
estimates: 
1976-2003 
Adding 
control 
variables to 
Carpenter et 
al. (2007), 
extending to 
include 2004 
Modified 
specification, 
limited to 
states that 
changed 
MLDA to 21 
before 1984 
Modified 
specification, limited 
to states that changed 
MLDA to 21 between 
1985-2004 
MLDA 18  .039  .038  .037  .05  .028 
  (3.9)***  (0.015)***  (.014)***  (.013)***  (.018) 
State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustered SE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  .086  .080  .081  .084  .80 
Observations  394,547  451,747  466,969  207,036  259,933 
 
Table 11 
WLS Estimates of MLDA 18 Effects on Heavy Episodic Drinking Participation Rates in High 
School Seniors, 1976-2004 MTF 
    Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
  Carpenter 
et al. 
(2007) 
estimates: 
1976-2003 
Replicating 
Carpenter et 
al. (2007) 
estimates: 
1976-2003 
Adding 
control 
variables to 
Carpenter et 
al. (2007), 
extending to 
include 2004 
Modified 
specification, 
limited to 
states that 
changed 
MLDA to 21 
before 1984 
Modified 
specification, limited 
to states that changed 
MLDA to 21 
between 1985-2004 
MLDA 18  .031  .034  .033  .037  .025 
  (4.0)***  (0.011)***  (.011)***  (.013)***  (.016) 
State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State Trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustered SE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  .075  .068  .068  .70  .69 
Observations  394,547  451,747  466,969  207,036  259,933 
Carpenter  et  al.  (2007)  includes  controls  for  demographic  covariates,  including:  age,  a  male 
indicator, an indicator for Hispanic ethnicity, an indicator for African American race, and an 
indicator for “other race,” as well as levels of the beer tax and presence of Zero Tolerance laws in 
a state-year. My controls include presence of BAC .08 per se law, state unemployment rates, per 
capita personal income rates, beer tax rates, and age of respondent. Robust standard errors are 
reported below point estimates for Models (1)-(4). The results in Carpenter et al. (2007) were 
reported with t-statistics instead of standard errors, and are reproduced as such.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.                                                                                                                                                                                29 
 
Table 12 
WLS Estimates of MLDA 18 Effects on Alcohol-Related Accidents 
in High School Seniors, 1976-2004 MTF 
   
  Dependent Variable: # of traffic-
related accidents after alcohol 
consumption 
MLDA 18  -.0007 
  (0.02) 
State Fixed Effects  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes 
State Trends  Yes 
Controls  Yes 
Clustered SE  Yes 
R-squared  .18 
Observations  457,145 
 
The  model  includes  variables  controlling  for  the  age  of  the  respondent,  the  state 
unemployment rate, state average per capita personal income, the beer tax rate in the state, 
vehicle miles traveled within state, the BAC limit for driving in a state, and a binary indicator 
for any mandatory seat belt law. They also allow for linear state trends. Robust standard 
errors are reported below point estimates.  
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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FIGURES 
FIGURE 1 
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FIGURE 2 
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FIGURE 3 
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FIGURE 4 
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FIGURE 5: AVERAGE TOTAL FATALITY RATE PER 100,000 18-20 YEAR OLDS  
1976-2005 
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FIGURE 6 
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FIGURE 8 
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